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Abstract 
This study provides an empirical comparative case study of representative claims-making in EU 
budget negotiations. Two questions are addressed in this paper. First, the paper asks what the role of 
elected or appointed partisan politicians is in comparison to other representatives. This question is 
relevant given the reported increasing importance of non-elected representatives. Secondly, the 
paper asks what the influence of institutional factors is on the practice of representative claims-
making. As representative claims-making unfolds in the public sphere, the institutional factors of the 
public sphere may affect both the claimants it provides a platform for as well as constituencies 
represented. The paper finds that politicians continue to perform a crucial role in representation, 
both with regards to their prominence in the public sphere and with regards to the plurality of 
constituencies represented in their claims. Although institutional factors clearly affect claimants, 
there are much less pronounced – though noticeable – differences in the constituencies represented 
in different public spheres. The overall picture is one of a highly plural representative space in which 
multiple claimants compete with each other to get their message across. In doing so, claimants 
address the interests of multiple constituencies. It may well be the inherent competition among 
claimants, fostered by institutional factors, that ensures the plurality of the EU representative space. 
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1. Introduction 
Perhaps the most (in)famous claim in EU politics is Margaret Thatcher’s statement of ‘I want 
my money back’. The former UK Prime Minister made this claim in the context of 
negotiations on the EU multi-annual budget at the time of the EU Fontainebleau summit, in 
1984. The claim was widely reported by mass media throughout Europe, and has resonated 
in EU budget negotiations ever since. It has strengthened an understanding of EU budget 
negotiations as highly conflictuous intergovernmental battles concerning Member States’ 
net-contributions (Dür and Mateo, 2008; Laffan, 1997; 2000; Lindner, 2006). Literally, the 
claim makes no sense as Mrs. Thatcher had no personal money invested in the EU. Yet, it is 
clear to all observers that she was in fact not talking about her own money, nor would she 
personally like to receive funds from the EU. Rather, she made an argument for the 
reduction of financial contributions of the United Kingdom to the EU budget. The statement 
presented herself – the claimant – as a representative of the UK – the constituency – in the 
public sphere and is thus an example of a practice referred to as representative claims-
making (Saward, 2006). 
 Theory about political representation has recently drawn attention to this practice of 
representative claims-making. The argument is that representation ought to be understood 
as a dynamic interrelationship between representatives and represented, which is 
constituted through discourse in the public sphere (Hendriks, 2009; Pollak et al., 2009; 
Rehfeld, 2006; Saward, 2006; 2009; Taylor, 2010). That is, representation should not be 
solely understood as a static relationship between elected politicians and voters, constituted 
through periodic elections. Instead, a dynamic understanding of representation is necessary 
in light of two trends facing western democracies. First, growing international 
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interdependencies as a result of globalisation problematise the principle of territorial 
representation on which nation-state democracy is founded. Decisions made by 
representatives of nation-states now carry consequences for people in other nation-states, 
even though they have no say in who is representing them. Secondly, elected politicians are 
losing their monopoly on representation as trust in political parties is declining throughout 
the west (Citrin, 1974; Katz and Mair, 1995). The two trends increasingly lead to blurred 
channels of representation and prominent roles for non-elected representatives in politics. A 
prime example is U2 singer Bono claiming to represent ‘Africa’ in his ‘Making Poverty 
History’ campaign (Saward, 2009). Of course, if Bono is to present himself as representative 
of Africa, he needs a platform to reach out to a wider audience. This brings us back to the 
public sphere in which representative claims-making unfolds and raises the question of how 
existing institutions structuring the public sphere provide a platform for different claimants 
to profile themselves. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this dynamic understanding of 
representation by conducting an in-depth empirical case study of representative claims-
making in EU practice. Two questions raised in the literature will be addressed. The first 
question concerns the extent to which representative claims-making in western democracies 
is still primarily conducted by elected or appointed party politicians (Hendriks, 2009; 
Schmitter, 2009). Secondly, the question is to what extent different institutional factors such 
as mass media affect the nature of representative claims-making (Pollak et al., 2009, p. 23), 
for instance by providing a platform for certain representatives while excluding others. 
 This paper investigates these two questions in the case of EU budget negotiations. It 
does so through a comparative study of claims-making in the media and parliaments of the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland in the three most recent multi-annual budget 
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negotiations. The EU budget affects a plurality of constituencies in the EU, multiple levels of 
government and has consequences for people living outside the EU (Begg, 2005; Laffan, 
1997; Lindner, 2006). It is a package deal of all EU revenues and expenditures. Expenditures 
include funds for farmers (Common Agricultural Policy) and poorer regions (Structural 
Funds), as well as EU administrative costs, development funds and nature preservation 
policy. The question of revenues concerns tax payers throughout the EU as well as the 
balance between richer, net-contributing Member States, and poorer net-recipient Member 
States. The EU budget thus provides an interesting case for the study of representative 
claims-making as it potentially concerns multiple representatives and multiple constituencies 
in a continuously developing representative space.  
  
2. Competitive Representative Claims-making 
Students of democratic political representation in the EU have largely followed a traditional 
focus on elections (Katz and Wessels, 1999; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999). This includes 
empirical comparative work on the demographics and opinions of political elites and 
citizens. Thus, Thomassen and Schmitt (1999) conclude that European Parliament elections 
do not function well as a representation mechanism since campaigns are not fought over 
European issues. However, although the mechanism is faulty, the result is normatively 
acceptable in as far as Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) do not significantly 
differ on left – right economic issues from the average voter (Thomassen and Schmitt, 1999). 
Yet, in political theory beyond EU studies, a more dynamic understanding of 
representation has recently been developed (Hendriks, 2009; Pollak et al., 2009; Rehfeld, 
2006; Saward, 2006; 2009). Here the focus is more on the act, rather than the result of 
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representation. In the words of Michael Saward (2006, p. 298): “We need to move away 
from the idea that representation is first and foremost a given, factual product of elections, 
rather than a precarious and curious sort of claim about a dynamic relationship.” This focus 
on the representative claim is particularly warranted, given the alleged decline of elected 
party political representatives in parliaments and governments whose legitimacy is based on 
clearly territorially demarcated constituencies. In a globalising world with increasing 
interdependencies among countries, people are affected by political decisions while not 
having voting rights in the relevant elections. Some non-elected representatives take up this 
perceived injustice (Saward, 2009). Elected political representatives have become further 
marginalised as a result of increasing technological complexity of policy issues. This has 
made professional experts and their networks increasingly important (Hendriks, 2009). 
Schmitter (2009), on the other hand, upholds that despite such developments, 
representation in ‘real existing western democracies’ is still dominated by political parties 
competing for office. These developments thus support an understanding of representation 
as act rather than result in which the importance of elected political elites ought to be 
questioned, rather than taken for granted.  
Representatives need not necessarily be elected in order to be legitimate 
representatives. Rather, they need to be accepted in their roles by the relevant audience 
(Rehfeld, 2006). The question is thus how (would be) representatives reach out to this wider 
audience. Therefore, this paper aims to look at acts of representation in the public sphere – 
or ‘representative claims’ (Saward, 2006; 2009) – through which the EU’s representative 
space is shaped and altered in public discourse (Trenz, 2009). Just like electoral rules affect 
the representative outcome and functioning of elections, so do institutions of the public 
sphere affect representative claims-making. Thus, understanding the public sphere as an 
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arena where a representative space is constantly reshaped and reproduced, directs our 
attention to ways in which the institutional factors of the public sphere affect this practice 
(Pollak et al., 2009, p. 23).  
Two primary institutions structuring the European public sphere in which 
representative claims-making unfolds are mass media and national parliaments (Eriksen and 
Fossum, 2002; Fraser, 1992). Mass media have come to dominate political communication in 
western societies, transforming modern politics into mediated politics (Altheide, 2004; 
Bennett and Entman, 2001). A range of different representatives have incentives to make 
the news with their claims on EU issues. This is so, not only because trust in political parties 
in Europe has been declining, but also because the under defined and continuously 
developing political nature of the EU forces both national and European politicians to seek 
legitimacy through reaching out to the public (Morgan, 2005). Yet, mass media operate 
under media logics making them non-neutral transmitters of representative claims. It is well 
known that media particularly report on personalised conflict (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). 
Also, quality journalists often aim to present ‘both sides of the story’, thus providing a 
platform for a plurality of representatives (Donsbach and Patterson, 2004). In short, mass 
media provide a competitive space, both in terms of which representatives make the news 
and in terms of emphasising conflict between them. The parliamentary arena is also 
characterised by institutionalised conflict. Here, different political parties compete for office 
and policies with the ever looming prospect of the next elections. This stimulates inter-party 
competition (King, 1976; Lijphart, 1999; Schumpeter, 1976). In the language of 
representative claims-making, elected party politicians in parliament have an incentive to 
present themselves as prime representatives of certain constituencies and challenge similar 
claims made by other parties. 
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This paper therefore places a focus on competition at the centre of the study of 
representative claims-making. A mapping of competitive representative claims-making in 
practice is necessary in order to answer the two central research questions of this paper. The 
analysis of the role of party politicians and institutional factors in representative claims-
making first requires answering a basic descriptive question: who claims to represent whom 
on relevant EU issues in the public sphere, how often, and where? In terms of amounts of 
claims, this will consequently allow for the comparison of how prominent different claimants 
are and to what extent they engage in addressing the interests of multiple constituencies. 
Furthermore, it will allow for the analysis of how prominent different constituencies feature 
in representative claims and whether they are claimed to be represented by multiple 
claimants or are rather monopolised by a single claimant. 
3. The Case of EU Budget Negotiations: Data and Method 
The EU may be considered an ideal laboratory for studying patterns in representative claims-
making for several reasons. First, the EU itself as a composite polity is characterised by three 
channels of representation (Lord and Pollak, 2010; Lord, 2007; Norris, 1997). Citizens directly 
elect the European Parliament and the different national parliaments. Furthermore, they are 
informally represented by interest groups, social movements and NGOs. Secondly, the EU as 
a polity itself remains constantly under development. It is as of yet unclear and contested 
what kind of polity the EU is and what it will become in the future. As a result, there are 
multiple competing representatives in need of legitimating themselves in the eyes of the 
wider public (Morgan, 2005). These representatives have a continuous incentive to establish 
a publically acknowledged role for them in the EU’s developing political system. 
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EU budget negotiations involve representatives from all three channels and, due to 
their periodic renegotiation, provide a picture of historical developments in the EU. The 
European Commission has sole right of initiative and interest groups such as farmers’ 
associations have an opportunity to influence the drafting of the proposals. Then, the 
different components of the financial perspectives are negotiated in the relevant Council of 
Ministers leading up to a unanimous decision on the whole package in the European Council. 
As the decision rests on unanimity, every national parliament has an opportunity to 
effectively control their government’s action in the Council. Finally, following the Council 
decision, the package is renegotiated between the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Commission resulting in an Inter Institutional Agreement. The periodic renegotiation of the 
budget, the involvement of a broad range of legislative actors from all three channels of 
representation, and the broad effects on multiple contributing and recipient constituencies 
make the EU Budget a highly interesting case for studying competitive representative claims-
making (Laffan, 1997; Lindner, 2006). 
In order to isolate and contextualise patterns in competitive representative claims-
making, the present study builds on an embedded comparative case study design (Yin, 
2003). Since a key characteristic of the representative claim is that an audience is able to 
observe the claim being made, a study of representative claims-making in the public sphere 
is conducted. There is as of yet little evidence of a single overarching European public sphere 
since there are few significant European-wide media outlets (Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007; 
Wessler et al., 2008). Rather, public spheres remain largely national in scope. A comparative 
study of national public spheres is thus necessary. In order to control for country specific 
characteristics that might affect representative claims on the EU budget, this study includes 
data from the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland. These three countries resemble a net-
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contributing country (Netherlands), a country receiving more or less as much from EU funds 
as it contributes (Denmark), and a net-recipient country (Ireland). To isolate possible 
institutional factors, both plenary parliamentary debates and newspaper articles are 
included. Finally, to minimise idiosyncrasies caused by unique events, data is collected from 
three different budget negotiations. This includes the three most recent negotiations on the 
financial perspectives of ‘Delors II’ (negotiated between February 1992 and December 1992), 
‘Agenda 2000’ (July 1997 – March 1993) and ‘Financial Perspectives 2007-2013’ (February 
2004 – December 2005). To summarise, the embedded comparative case study includes data 
from three different countries with different net-contributions to the budget, two of the 
most prominent institutionalised public spheres and the three most recent budget 
negotiations. 
Taking into account the operationalisation of a representative claim by Saward 
(2006), this study builds on the empirically tested method of claims-making analysis 
(Koopmans, 2002; Koopmans and Statham, 1999) as a specific form of qualitative content 
analysis. A claim is defined as a unit of strategic or communicative action in the public 
sphere: ‘... which articulate[s] political demands, decisions, implementations, calls to action, 
proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or 
integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors in a policy field’ (Statham, 2005, p. 
12). The archetypical claim would be a verbal speech act concerning some political good that 
could be loosely translated as: “I (do not) want …”. However, the definition above is far more 
inclusive, including claims such as meetings of the European Council, protests by farmers, 
resolutions tabled by parliaments and critical comments by journalists. In textual terms, a 
claim can be as short as a few words, or as elaborate as several paragraphs, as long as it is 
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made by the same claimant(s), making a single argument on a single topic related to the EU 
budget.  
Coded variables of claims include WHERE and WHEN, WHO makes a claim, on WHAT, 
HOW, addressing WHOM, for/against WHOSE interests and WHY. Of particular importance 
for the present analysis are the claimant variables (‘WHO’) and constituency variables 
(‘WHOSE interests’). It should be noted here that although all claims are made by a claimant 
in a particular time and space, not all claims are representative claims in the sense that they 
include an explicitly stated constituency. Only representative claims, including an explicitly 
stated constituency potentially affected by the claim, are included in the analysis. Further 
note that a representative claim in the definition used here does not always advance the 
interests of the mentioned constituency. A claim can also explicitly target the interests of a 
particular constituency, claimed to be illegitimate or overrepresented. 
A sample of newspaper articles and parliamentary debates was coded using ATLAS.ti 
software, which were consequently exported to PASW/SPSS for quantitative analysis. The 
newspapers included in the sampling are NRC Handelsblad, Trouw and Algemeen Dagblad 
for the Netherlands; Berlingske Tidene, Politikken and B.T. for Denmark; and Irish Times and 
Irish Independent for Ireland. This study thus incorporates both quality and sensation-
oriented newspapers of different political signature in all three countries. As differences 
between quality and sensation outlets are larger than between different media – e.g. TV and 
newspapers – this sample arguably forms a representative sample of national media 
(Semetko et al., 2001). Newspaper articles and plenary debates were sampled from 
digitalised archives using the search string: “European budget” OR “EC / EU budget” OR 
“Delors II / Agenda 2000 / financial perspectives”, with the exception of plenary debates 
from 1992 in the Netherlands and Denmark, which were manually selected from the physical 
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archives of the Tweede Kamer and Folketinget. For the Netherlands and Denmark, every 
fourth newspaper article in chronological order and all plenary debates were selected for 
coding. Sampling for Ireland was twice as restrictive to cope with a larger amount of data. In 
total, 462 newspaper articles and 133 parliamentary debates were coded, resulting in 4435 
claims1. Of these 4435 claims, 2129 (48%) contained explicit references to constituencies 
and are thus defined as representative claims. 
 
4. Claimants and Constituencies 
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of representative claims made in the media and 
parliaments respectively during EU budget negotiations. In the discussion of the data 
provided in Tables 1 and 2, attention will first be drawn to the presence of different 
claimants – or representatives – in both the media and in parliament. Secondly, the presence 
of constituencies – or represented – in both forums will be discussed. Furthermore, this 
descriptive discussion will be related to the two central questions of this paper: what is the 
role of elected or appointed party politicians as representatives in EU budget negotiations 
and how is competitive representative claims-making affected by the institutional factors 
structuring the public sphere? 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
                                                     
1
 The codebook, the heuristic ATLAS.ti files and the SPSS database can be obtained from the author upon 
request.  
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Table 2 about here 
 
4.1. Claimants 
Interestingly, the most prominent representatives in the media (29,6% of all representative 
claims; Table 1) are those representing other Member States. Typically, such representatives 
are government executives, such as Prime Ministers, Finance Ministers or Presidents. For 
example, discussing the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty, the Irish Independent 
reported that: ‘Spanish Premier Felipe Gonzalez was a major driving force behind the 
planning for the [Cohesion] fund and his government feels that Spain has not received its 
proper share of EC [European Community] aid in the past.’ (Downing, 1992). We find similar 
claims in Danish news, as exemplified by a claim reported in Berlingske Tidene: ’Countries 
like Germany and Sweden, which pay considerably more to the EU than they get back, are at 
this moment fighting with all they have got to restrict the EU budget.’2 (Kragh, 2004). As 
these examples underline, EU budget negotiations were often portrayed as struggles 
between different Member State governments (cf. De Wilde, 2010). Particularly prominent 
are the ‘big three’: Germany, France and the UK, but also the Spanish government 
prominently featured in the news as representative of poorer Member States (Laffan, 2000). 
This finding may be considered interesting given that media cater to national audiences and 
therefore usually tend to emphasise domestic actors and interests (Hurrelmann et al., 2009). 
In this perspective, the relative prominence of international actors is remarkable. It needs to 
be noted here, however, that all three countries included in the sample are smaller Member 
States and the relative prominence of foreign actors may have been lower in German, 
                                                     
2
 Lande som Tyskland og Sverige, der indbetaler væsentligt mere til EU, end de får tilbage, kæmper i øjeblikket 
med alle midler for at få begrænset EU-budgettet, som i overordnede træk fastlægges for seks år ad gangen. 
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French or UK news. Besides governments of other Member States, prominent roles in the 
news were performed by the EU (European Council, rotating Presidency, European 
Parliament) (19,0% of representative claims) and the European Commission as key initiator 
of the negotiations (18,9%). For example, Commission President Delors claimed to represent 
poorer Member States in particular when presenting Delors II: ‘Delors wants to take into 
account differences in welfare within the EC. He demands a larger share of GDP from 
Member States. Obligatory VAT contributions from EC capitals can then be reduced. Poorer 
Member States, where a larger share of income is consumed than in rich countries, will profit 
from this’.3 (Aben, 1992). The national government would typically be quoted in response to 
the claims of EU officials and other Member State governments (17,5% of representative 
claims in the media), in particular concerning the ‘national interest’: ‘”What is on the table 
now is unacceptable for the Netherlands,” argued Balkenende after yesterday’s government 
meeting. The government wants a significantly lower contribution to Europe than foreseen in 
the compromise tabled by Juncker, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg. “These proposals are 
unthinkable. They mean no significant improvement of the Dutch net-contribution,” the 
Prime Minister stated.’4 (Trouw, 2005). The national government regularly performs a dual 
representative role in the media. It defends the national interest in EU framework while at 
the same time defending the EU interest against domestic critics. The Irish Prime Minister 
                                                     
3
 Delors wil meer dan voorheen rekening houden met verschillen in welvaart binnen de EG. Hij verlangt van de 
lidstaten een groter deel (om precies te zijn 1,37 procent) van hun bruto nationaal produkt (nu is dat bijna 1,15 
procent). De verplichte BTW-afdrachten uit de EG-hoofdsteden kunnen dan omlaag. De armere landen, waar 
inwoners een groter deel van hun inkomen consumeren dan in rijke landen, zullen daarvan profiteren. 
4
 "Wat er nu ligt is voor Nederland een onbegaanbare weg," zei Balkenende gisteren na afloop van de 
wekelijkse ministerraad. Het kabinet wil een fors mindere afdracht aan Europa dan het compromis van de 
Luxemburgse premier Juncker. Hij heeft voorgesteld de Nederlandse bijdrage met 300 tot 500 miljoen euro te 
verminderen. "Deze voorstellen zijn ondenkbaar. Ze zijn geen verbetering van de netto-betalingspositie van 
Nederland," benadrukte de premier. 
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Bertie Ahern took the effort to write a letter to the Irish Independent representing the EU in 
Ireland while explaining how he and other European executives represented their nation 
states in the EU: ‘These [EU budget] negotiations involve 25 Governments strongly pursuing 
their specific national interests while at the same time seeking to shape an overall agreement 
which will better promote those national interests than any Member State could do acting 
alone. That is what the European Union is about.’ (Ahern, 2005). Finally, a smaller but still 
significant role was played by journalists (9,0%) and farmers’ associations (4,7%). Typically, 
journalists would take issue in op-eds with what in their eyes appears as irrational or unjust 
results from ad-hoc intergovernmental negotiations. For example, Danish journalist Ole Bang 
Nielsen (1998) argued in favour of a more just distribution of EU funds: ‘In 2006, the New 
Member States will receive 14% of the EU budget, including agricultural funds. As the 
Enlargement will at least include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic with 58 million 
inhabitants, it is comparable to the 1980s enlargement with Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
There are today 59 million inhabitants in these three ’poor’ Member States, but they receive 
30% of EU funds. Candidate countries will not realistically have any influence on this biased 
distribution of EU funds [...].’5 
A clearly different picture emerges in the parliamentary debates (Table 2). Logically, 
since parliamentary rules generally only allow Members of Parliament and members of the 
government to take the floor, all claimants fall into the category ‘national politicians’. When 
looking at the prominence of different party families, it is again unsurprising to find the 
                                                     
5
 I år 2006 er det beregnet, at de nye medlemslande samlet vil modtage ca. 14 procent af EUs budget , inklusive 
landbrugsstøtte. Da udvidelsen mindst må antages at omfatte landene Polen, Ungarn og Tjekkiet med i alt 58 
mio. indbyggere er den på sin vis at sammenligne med optagelsen af de tre sydeuropæiske lande Spanien, 
Portugal og Grækenland i 80erne. I disse tre »fattige« EU-lande bor der i dag 59 mio. mennesker, men de 
modtager næsten 30 pct. af udbetalingerne fra EUs budget. Kandidatlandene kan næppe under 
optagelsesforhandlingerne nå at få nogen væsentlig indflydelse på denne skæve fordeling af EUs midler *…+. 
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largest political parties of the mainstream centre (Conservatives, Christian Democrats, 
Liberals and Social Democrats) to be making the most amount of claims. Together, these 
mainstream parties are responsible for 73,9% of representative claims made in parliament. 
This reflects their dominance in both parliament and government. A significant share of 
these claims would be made by government officials outlining their strategy in EU 
negotiations. Thus, Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern argued how he defended Irish 
agricultural interests: ‘From the outset we have availed of every opportunity to highlight the 
serious repercussions the [EU budget] reform proposals would have for Irish industry. Beet 
has long been a valuable cash crop for Irish farmers, as well as playing a significant role in 
the tillage cycle. Some 3,700 beet growers and producers, whose representatives I met last 
week, and the 1,000 people employed in the processing sector could be wiped out if the 
[European] Commission goes ahead with the proposals in this regard.’ (Dáil Éireann, 2005a). 
Claiming to represent the interests of farmers in the Irish parliament might be considered a 
no-brainer, since Irish farmers receive large amounts of EU funds contributing to Ireland’s 
status as a net-recipient country. Yet, government – opposition dynamics would even in such 
cases bring members of the opposition to challenge government by representing alternative 
interests. In the heat of discussions on Agenda 2000, where major Irish agricultural interests 
were at stake, Trevor Sargent TD of the Green Party challenged government as follows: ’The 
Santer proposals will further widen the link between the primary producer, the farmer, and 
the consumer and it is time consumers were much more involved in this debate.’ (Dáil 
Éireann, 1997). Similarly, the Dutch government’s efforts to reduce Dutch net-contributions 
were challenged in parliament. For example, Leoni Sipkes of the Green Left party 
(GroenLinks) argued: ‘It appears that [Finance] Minister Zalm calculated the Dutch 
contribution too high by approximately 2 billion [Guilders]. The Minister denies this 
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vehemently. In light of all the embarrassing government behaviour concerning contributions, 
I would like to ask the Prime Minister to supply us with a clear letter on this issue, so we may 
know what we are talking about.’6 (Tweede Kamer, 1997). Government and opposition 
representatives in parliament thus went into debate concerning both which constituencies 
ought to be represented and what exactly their stakes were in the EU budget. 
With regards to the first research question, the conclusion is that elected or 
appointed party politicians continue to dominate the public sphere as representatives. In the 
media, we find that the executives of other Member States, the European Commission and 
the national government are most prominent as makers of representative claims. Together, 
party politicians are responsible for 78,9% of claims in the media and 100% of claims in 
parliament. Clearly, institutional factors matter as only elected politicians feature in 
parliamentary debates, whereas the media provide a more plural representative space. 
Besides party politicians, journalists and farmers contribute significantly to representative 
claims-making in the media. Finally, there is a clear difference among claimants with regards 
to how many different constituencies they claim to represent. Party politicians of both the 
Member State in question and other Member States together with EU officials and 
journalists defend and/or challenge the interests of all groups of constituencies presented in 
Tables 1 and 2. They may thus be characterised as ‘general’ or ‘plural’ representatives 
engaging in a broad debate on the interests of many different constituencies. Other 
claimants, like Countries outside the EU, Organised Business, Farmers and Citizens primarily 
                                                     
6
 Het schijnt dat minister Zalm de Nederlandse bijdrage zo’n 2 mld. te hoog heeft berekend. De minister 
weerspreekt dat op zeer hoge toon. Gezien al het, soms genant verongelijkte gedoe van Nederland over zijn 
EU-bijdrage, wil ik de minister-president vragen of wij hierover een klip en klare brief kunnen krijgen, zodat we 
weten waar we over praten. 
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claim to represent themselves or their direct constituencies. These claimants can thus be 
characterised as ‘niche’ or special interests representatives. 
 
4.2. Constituencies 
The prominence of other Member State governments as representatives in the news directly 
translates in prominence of other Member States as the most prominent constituency. Close 
to one third of representative claims in newspapers (29,6%) portrayed other Member States 
as the main interested party in EU budget negotiations of which half (14,1%) were made by 
other Member State representatives themselves. A few examples of this have been given 
above. Additional prominent constituencies include the nation (17,8%), often represented as 
either net-contributor or net-recipient of EU funds. Although these claims were most often 
made by executive actors, Members of Parliament regularly engaged the budget debate in 
the media as well. Either they would be quoted by journalists, or they would send in a letter, 
like Tom Behnke MF of the Danish Progress Party (Fremskridspartiet) did in 1992: ‘A welfare 
tax that Danish society must pay because we are rich. According to the ”Delors II” plans, 
Danish contributions will rise by 30% to 12 billion Kroner per year. The state has two 
possibilities for paying this tax. The first is to raise taxes in Denmark, to the detriment of all 
Danish. The second is to cut in public welfare provisions. This would weaken Danish social 
security, to the detriment of the weakest in Danish society.’7 (Behnke, 1992). The EU (15,9%) 
was regularly represented in claims in terms of whether the budget was in the EU’s general 
                                                     
7
 En velfærdsskat som det danske samfund skal betale for at være rigere. Ifølge »Delors II -planen« skal 
Danmarks bidrag stige med 30 pct. til 12 mia. kr. om året. Denne skat vil staten have to muligheder for at 
betale. Den ene mulighed er at sætte skatten op i Danmark, hvilket vil skade alle danskere. Den anden er at 
beskære i de offentlige overførselsindkomster. Dermed forringes det danske sociale sikkerhedsnet, hvilket især 
vil skade de svageste grupper i det danske samfund. 
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interest and how budget negotiations, national contributions and the possibility of an EU tax 
impacted the stability and legitimacy of the EU as polity. Successive Commission Presidents 
all defended proposed increases in the EU budget as being in the wider EU interest: ‘Mr. 
Barroso maps out ambitious plans in two of the EU's "growth areas": increased co-operation 
in home affairs and in beefing up Europe's presence on the world stage. Presenting his plans 
to the European parliament, the new Commission president said the EU could not deliver 
unless it was given the money to do so, a warning shot to countries like Germany, Britain and 
France, which want tight curbs on its next budget.’ (Irish Times, 2005). Yet, it is not so that 
representatives only claim to represent their ‘formal’ constituency. National politicians 
regularly claimed to represent the EU interest and EU officials claimed to represent national 
interests. Illustrative is a conflict between the Dutch Social Democrats (PvdA) in government 
and their MEP representative Piet Dankert during the negotiations on Agenda 2000. Dankert 
discussed criticism from his national colleagues after having challenged the Dutch 
negotiating strategy as not being in the national interest: ‘In contrast to members of the 
Tweede Kamer, we [MEPs] alledgedly would not be willing to defend the interests of the 
Netherlands. State secretary Patijn [European Affairs] dares to ask who we think we are 
representing.’8 (Dankert, 1997). Farmers – being the primary recipients of the funds in the 
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, which takes around 40% of the EU budget – are 
prominently represented by a variety of claimants, not least by themselves and their own 
professional organisations. Also in net-contributing countries like the Netherlands, farmers 
made the news defending their own interests: ‘A substantial dispossession of income for 
both crop and livestock farmers. That is the direct consequence of European Commission 
                                                     
8
 In tegenstelling tot leden van de Tweede Kamer zouden wij geen oog hebben voor het Nederlands belang. 
Staatssecretaris Patijn durft zich dan ook af te vragen wie wij eigenlijk wel vertegenwoordigen. 
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plans for agricultural policy as they were presented yesterday, according to agricultural 
association LTO Nederland. Price reductions in milk, wheat and meat will only partially be 
compensated and that is unacceptable to the farmers’ association.’9 (Trouw, 1998). 
In Parliament, on the other hand, the interests of other Member States where 
represented less than in the media, though still present in the debates (9,4%). For instance, 
the interests of the new Eastern European Member States were claimed to be represented 
by Noel Treacy, Minister of European Affairs for the governing conservative party (Fianna 
Fáil): ‘The enlarged European Union needs a [budget] deal now. This is of particular interest 
to the new member states which rely on cohesion funding to help drive their individual 
domestic economies forward. This point was brought home to me at many meetings of the 
cohesion countries where I represented Ireland, to underline our continuing commitment to 
the principles of economic solidarity which lie at the heart of the European Union.’ (Dáil 
Éireann, 2005b). Most represented in parliament were the interests of the nation (23,8%) 
and farmers (20,3%), but also those of countries outside the EU (17%) and citizens and tax 
payers (10,9%). Although rarely the recipient of direct EU funds, countries outside the EU are 
often argued – by leftist parties in particular – to be negatively affected by the EU’s CAP 
which limits their possibilities to export agricultural products to the EU (cf. Karimi MP in 
Tweede Kamer, 2005).  Furthermore, the second budget under study – Agenda 2000 – was 
specifically presented by the Commission as preparing the EU for Eastern enlargement, 
including funds to help bring candidate countries into the EU. In terms of differences among 
political party families, the national interest is most often claimed to be represented by 
                                                     
9
 Een forse achteruitgang in inkomen van zowel akkerbouwers als melk- en rundveehouders. Dat is volgens 
landen tuinbouworganisatie LTO Nederland het directe gevolg van de plannen van de Europese Commissie met 
het landbouwbeleid, zoals die gisteren werden gepresenteerd. De prijsdalingen voor melk, graan en vlees 
zullen slechts ten dele worden gecompenseerd, en dat is voor de boerenorganisatie onaanvaardbaar. 
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centre-right parties (Conservatives 9,2%; Christian Democrats 4,2% of representative claims 
in Parliament) whereas radical right parties present themselves as the primary defender of 
the tax payer’s interests (2,9% of representative claims in Parliament). The latter would 
typically field in an argument to reduce EU funds. 
To conclude, elected and appointed politicians continue to perform an important role 
when it comes to representative claims-making. Not only because they frequently feature in 
the news and feature exclusively in parliamentary debates as discussed above, but also 
because they claim to represent a wide range of different constituencies, both in the media 
and in parliament. To some extent the constituencies represented may not be surprising as 
national politicians claim to represent the national interest and EU officials claim to 
represent the EU interest, or when right-wing parties defend the interests of farmers and 
taxpayers while left-wing parties defend the interests of third world countries. Yet, the 
discussion above has also shown representatives to engage with each other. They do so in 
particular by discrediting the representative claims of other representatives in various ways. 
The result is a highly plural representative space where elected and appointed politicians 
perform a vital role in claiming to represent a multitude of constituencies and no 
constituency is monopolised by a single representative. The institutional factors have been 
shown to have an influence on the prominence of different constituencies, though 
institutional effects on who is represented are clearly less influential than on who is 
performing the representation. 
 
21 
 
5. Conclusion 
Within political theory, attention has recently been drawn to representative claims-making 
as a dynamic practice, rather than understanding representation as a static result of periodic 
elections (Hendriks, 2009; Rehfeld, 2006; Saward, 2006; 2009). This theoretical innovation 
has opened up the questions of how elected or appointed party politicians and other 
representatives present themselves as claimants in the public sphere and how different 
institutional factors affect this practice of representative claims-making. 
 From the perspective of EU studies, the challenge in the study of representative 
claims-making is now two-fold. First, based on the theoretical work of Saward and others, a 
mapping of the EU representative space as constituted by claims is necessary in order to 
enrich our understanding of EU representative politics beyond the election of the national 
and European parliaments. Secondly, lessons from such empirical exercises should be drawn 
to improve upon the theory of representative claims-making as, so far, empirical studies of 
representative claims-making remain scarce. This study has aimed to contribute to these two 
frontiers by conducting a comparative empirical case study of debates on EU budget 
negotiations in the media and parliaments of the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland. 
Dominant thought about EU budget negotiations perceives them as intergovernmental 
negotiations of Member State governments defending mutually excluding national interests. 
In contrast, representative claims-making analysis in this study has shown that there is a 
multitude of claimants contributing to the debates, claiming to represent a multitude of 
constituencies. Thus, the representative space of EU budget negotiations is much more 
plural than indicated in EU budget literature.  
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Despite the increasingly important role of non-elected representatives as a result of 
both globalisation and declining trust in political parties, this study finds that elected or 
appointed party politicians continue to perform a key role as representatives in the EU 
public sphere. Media prominently feature members of the national government, but also 
other Member State governments, EU officials and parliamentarians. In parliament, 
mainstream parties dominate, but the entire political spectrum from left to right engages in 
highly various representative claims-making. Together with journalists in the media, party 
politicians engage in the broadest or most general form of representation, addressing the 
interests of a wide variety of constituencies. This stands in contrast to niche representatives, 
like farmers’ associations and citizens. Elected or appointed politicians thus maintain a key 
role in the EU’s representative space. Yet, they clearly do not monopolise representation as 
significant roles in the media are played by farmers’ associations and journalists among 
others.  
There are very clear differences between the media and parliaments with regards to 
the claimants present in these respective public spheres. Media present a platform for a 
plurality of claimants, of which a large proportion consists of other Member States’ 
governments, EU officials and non-elected representatives. In contrast, parliamentary 
debates only field Members of Parliament and ministers, where the mainstream parties are 
dominant given their larger share of parliamentary seats and government positions. A 
difference of constituencies is also noticeable, but it is much less pronounced than the 
difference in claimants. This points to how dynamics of competition that structure both mass 
media and parliamentary public spheres stimulate pluralism in representation. 
Representative claims in the media feature other Member States, the nation and the EU as 
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most prominent constituencies. In parliament, the nation, farmers and countries outside the 
EU are the three most often claimed constituencies.  
This empirical study of representative claims-making draws attention to an aspect of 
representative claims-making that has so far been under appreciated in the theoretical 
literature. In emphasising the dynamic nature of representative claims-making, the inherent 
competitiveness of claims-making has been neglected. Both claimants and constituencies 
compete for presence in the public sphere. Even if different dynamics of media logic and 
partisan conflict underlie this competition, claimants compete with each other to bring their 
message across to potential constituencies. As illustrated by the examples of representative 
claims, claimants often combine a defence or challenge concerning a particular 
constituency’s interests with a challenge to other claimants’ conduct as representatives. 
Furthermore, this competition results in constituencies becoming contested by multiple 
claimants. That is, this study does not find important constituencies to be monopolised by 
one or few claimants. Rather, intensive representative claims-making concerning a particular 
constituency coincides with multiple claimants defending, challenging and reinterpreting the 
interests in question. We may therefore tentatively conclude that it is particularly this 
competitive nature of representative claims-making, stimulated by institutional factors in 
both mass media and parliamentary arenas, that ensures a plural representative space in the 
EU public sphere. 
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Table 1: Percentages of Representative Claims in the Media, N = 1059 
 
 
 
Constituency 
Nation EU European 
Commissio
n 
Other 
Member 
State(s) 
Countries 
outside the 
EU 
Organised 
Business 
Farmers Citizens / 
Tax Payers 
Other Total 
Claimant National Politicians 6.2% 2.8% .1% 2.4% 1.1% .7% 1.6% 1.6% .9% 17.5% 
EU 2.0% 3.7% .5% 6.6% 2.0% .5% 1.6% .7% 1.5% 19.0% 
European Commission 3.5% 3.6% .3% 4.1% 2.2% .9% 2.5% 1.0% .9% 18.9% 
Other Member States 1.5% 3.5% .1% 14.1% .7% .1% 1.7% 1.2% .1% 22.9% 
Countries outside the EU         .6%         .6% 
Organised Business .1%   .1%     .3%       .5% 
Journalist 1.9% 1.4% .3% 1.6% .3% .4% 1.0% 1.5% .8% 9.0% 
Farmers .7%           4.0% .1%   4.7% 
Citizens / Tax Payers   .2%           .3%   .5% 
Other 1.9% .7% .2% .9% .4% .1% .6% .9% .8% 6.5% 
Total 17.8% 15.9% 1.5% 29.6% 7.2% 2.9% 13.0% 7.2% 5.0% 100.0% 
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Table 2: Percentages of Representative Claims in Parliament, N = 1070 
 
 
Constituency 
Nation EU 
European 
Commissio
n 
Other 
Member 
State(s) 
Country(ies) 
outside the 
EU 
Organised 
Business Farmers 
Citizens / 
Tax Payers Other Total 
Claimant 
Affiliation 
Radical Left 2.0% .6% .1% .2% .3% .1% .9% 1.5% 1.0% 6.7% 
Green .6% .8%   .3% 4.2%   1.0% 1.4% .4% 8.7% 
Social Democrat 2.9% 1.4%   2.3% 4.7%   3.5% 1.4% 1.6% 17.9% 
Progressive Liberal .8% .4%   .6% .9%   .4% .3% .3% 3.7% 
Liberal 2.9% 1.4% .1% .7% 2.0%   3.3% .8% .2% 11.4% 
Christian Democrat 4.2% 1.3%   1.3% .9% .1% 4.1% 1.7% 2.3% 15.9% 
Conservatives 9.2% 2.7% .0% 3.2% 1.0% .7% 5.6% .8% 1.7% 25.0% 
Radical Right 1.2% .5%   .9% 3.0%   1.6% 2.9% .8% 10.7% 
Total 23.8% 9.0% .2% 9.4% 17.0% 1.0% 20.3% 10.9% 8.4% 100.0% 
 
 
